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Such regulatory foresight is increasingly demanded as societies prosper and, ironically, as they become safer.
Both hybridization and foresight are essential strategies for risk management in a changing world. To make the most of these strategies, this chapter suggests, we should consciously construct a global policy laboratory-which in turn involves a bit of regulatory hindsight.
Regulatory Oversight
Regulations can be necessary to correct market failures such as externalities (e.g., health, safety, and environmental risks), asymmetric information, and market power. Regulation can help solve such social problems, but it can also induce its own problems, including compliance costs, inhibition of innovation, ancillary risks, and rent-seeking. As a result, wherever states deploy regulation, demand arises for oversight of the regulatory system to reduce the costs and side eff ects of regulation, increase the benefi ts of regulation, and promote transparency and accountability.
Regulatory oversight systems go further than academic or episodic project-oriented BCA by creating institutions for broad application of RIA (typically using BCA) to evaluate all signifi cant regulatory actions, with a body to review the RIAs prepared by regulatory agencies (OECD a) . Th e function of regulatory oversight may be located in the judiciary (judicial review of administrative agency action), the executive (center-of-government regulatory review, typically in the presidency or head of government, sometimes in an agency or a multiagency council), the legislature (an expert body assisting the legislature, or legislative review of administrative action), or an independent entity (such as a neutral review board, auditor, or ombudsman).
A "regulatory oversight body" (ROB) typically means a centralized government unit atop the executive hierarchy that uses expertise to supervise regulatory action by agencies (Lindseth, Aman, and Raul ; Wiener and Alemanno ; Cordova-Novion and Jacobzone ). ROBs provide both expertise (through expert staff and analytic methods) and political accountability (such as to the president or prime minister); these objectives may be mutually reinforcing but may pose tensions at times (Shapiro ) .
ROBs may have a variety of functions and powers, including commenting on (and assisting in improving) the quality of an agency's RIA; constraining agency action when an RIA is deemed inadequate or when the benefi ts of an agency's proposed regulation do not justify the costs; calling on agencies to review existing regulations for their benefi ts and costs; prompting agency action when BCA identifi es a socially promising regulation that agencies are not yet promulgating; and fostering transparency in the reporting of regulatory impacts. And ROBs' functions and powers may diff er across polities, in part because ROBs may be located in diff erent branches or units of diff erent constitutional structures accorded different roles and powers, such as parliamentary versus presidential systems. A key point here is that the ROB's authority to guide regulatory decision-making will depend on its institutional role among the branches or power centers of government (Wiener and Alemanno ) . (For more detailed analyses of ROBs' legal bases, functions, powers, and constitutional structures, see Wiener and Alemanno ; Cordova-Novion and Jacobzone ).
For example, in the United States, the Offi ce of Information and Regulatory Aff airs (OIRA), created in , located within the Offi ce of Management and Budget (OMB) in the Executive Offi ce of the President, performs all of these functions pursuant to a series of executive orders issued by several presidents of both political parties (notably Jimmy Carter's Executive Order , of , preceding OIRA; Ronald Reagan's Executive Order , of ; and Bill Clinton's Executive Order , of , which remains in force today and has been extended by Barack Obama's Executive Orders , and , of , and , of May ). OIRA regularly exercises its authority to "return" agency regulatory proposals that do not meet the analytic and net benefi ts criteria set forth in the executive order, and OIRA has occasionally sent a "prompt" to agencies to pursue regulations that promise net benefi ts (Graham ; Revesz and Livermore ) . BCA had been employed in the United States to assess public projects for decades before the creation of OIRA, including for fl ood control projects and military procurement (Quah and Toh ) . Following the wave of regulatory legislation and the expansion of the administrative state during the s and s, the advent of RIA in the s and OIRA review in the s created an institutional structure for regulatory oversight-a system that has been reaffi rmed in a bipartisan consensus across every subsequent presidential administration (Kagan ; Wiener and Alemanno ). Many of the U.S. member states have also adopted RIA systems (Schwartz ) . But in the United States, RIAs and OIRA review are evaluations of agency rulemakings-agency actions to implement authority delegated by the legislature through statutes-not appraisals of the bills initially proposed in the legislature.
In the European Union, impact assessment was launched by the Better Regulation Initiative over - (Wiener ) , and the EU Impact Assessment Board (IAB) was then created in . Th e IAB, a fi ve-member board, is located within the Secretariat General in the Presidency of the European Commission. It began as a commenter on RIA quality and has grown to play a wider role (Wiener and Alemanno ) . Since , the president of the European Commission has required new regulatory proposals to obtain a positive opinion from the IAB before going forward (European Commission , -), giving the IAB an authority more akin to OIRA's "return letter" than the IAB had previously had. Strikingly, while the IAB returned for "resubmission" only  percent of regulatory proposals in , by  it was returning  percent (and then  percent in , perhaps indicating a plateau) (European Commission , fi g. ). And in the EU, impact assessment and IAB review includes evaluations of proposals for legislation-that is, proposals by the Commission that will be forwarded to the European Parliament and Council. Similarly, in France, the new Organic Law of April ,  (Loi organique n° - du  avril  relative à l'application des articles -,  et  de la Constitution) requires an impact analysis reviewed by the Conseil d'Etat before a bill can be proposed to the National Assembly.
Diffusion
Regulatory oversight is now being "diff used throughout the globe" (Radaelli and De Francesco ) . Just as the number of regulatory agencies worldwide has grown, especially rapidly since about  (Levi-Faur , fi g. .), so the number of ROBs has also grown over that period. Institutions for regulatory oversight have spread from about half of the twenty-seven OECD members in , to virtually all of the now thirty-one OECD members in  (Cordova-Novion and Jacobzone , fi g. ) and to virtually all EU members (De Francesco ). Mechanisms for regulatory oversight are also appearing in international organizations (see the chapter by Alberto Alemanno in this volume).
Th e creation in  of the ROB at the EU level, the IAB, followed at least fi ve years of development of an RIA system-starting with the EU's Better Regulation initiative and its impact assessment guidelines (Wiener ) . Additional examples of ROBs in OECD member states include the Productivity Commission and the Offi ce of Best Practice Regulation (OBPR) in Australia (where RIA has been employed since ); the Simplifi cation and Better Regulation Unit in Denmark; the function of the Conseil d'Etat in supervising impact analyses pursuant to the Organic Law of April , , in France; the Administrative Burdens Board in the Netherlands; the Better Regulation Unit in Germany; the Administrative Evaluation Bureau in Japan; the Comisi ó n Federal de Mejora Regulatoria (COFEMER) in Mexico; the Regulatory Reform Committee (RRC) and Regulatory Reform Bureau in South Korea; and the Better Regulation Executive and associated regulatory committees in the United Kingdom (a survey is provided in Cordova-Novion and Jacobzone ). In South Korea, spurred by an economic crisis in the s, the government enacted the Basic Act on Administrative Regulations in , and the RRC then undertook an extensive review of existing regulations resulting in thousands of revisions and repeals, as well as RRC oversight of RIAs for newly proposed regulations (Truen ; Cordova-Novion and Jacobzone ). In Chile, the economic evaluation requirement for environmental regulations (pursuant to Law , of ) has been supplemented by an RIA process created in Law , of , though it remains unclear whether a ROB will supervise this RIA process (OECD ). Related systems exist or are being developed in other OECD members, including New Zealand, Poland, Portugal, Sweden, and Turkey (Cordova-Novion and Jacobzone ).
We can expect the spread of ROBs using RIA, and the collaborative dialogue among those institutions, to continue. In March , the OECD issued a major set of twelve recommendations to all governments, including on evaluating regulatory quality, using RIA for both ex ante (prospective) and ex post (retrospective) regulatory review, creating ROBs, and engaging in international regulatory cooperation (OECD ). In May , President Obama issued Executive Order , to promote international regulatory cooperation.
Th e legal bases, constitutional structures, and powers of these ROBs diff er across countries. Just more than half (so far) of the ROBs in the OECD member states are empowered to review agency RIAs (Cordova-Novion and Jacobzone , fi g. ). Some, like US OIRA, review agencies' proposed regulations to implement statutes already enacted by the legislature; others, like the EU IAB, review initial proposals for legislation (usually within the branch of government that initiates such proposals); this diff erence in structure entails diff erences in interbranch (executive vs. legislative) relations over policymaking and power (Wiener and Alemanno ) . Th e U.S. OIRA, the EU IAB, the OBPR in Australia, the RRC in Korea, and COFEMER in Mexico must generally give a positive opinion for a proposed regulation to proceed, or they have the power to return regulatory proposals (though there are exceptions in each system) (Cordova-Novion and Jacobzone , table A.). Many or all ROBs can request analytic improvements in a draft RIA. Japan's Administrative Evaluation Bureau, the Administrative Burdens board in the Netherlands, and Germany's Better Regulation Unit can review the quality of RIAs but do not return proposed regulations (Cordova-Novion and Jacobzone , table A.). Review of the existing stock of regulations (also known as ex post, retrospective, or "lookback" review) is being emphasized in the Australian regulatory oversight system (Australian Productivity Commission ) and in the United States (under Executive Order , issued in ).
RIA and ROBs are also beginning to spread beyond the OECD to developing countries (Truen ; World Bank Group ; Jacobs ; Kirkpatrick and Zhang ). In many countries, as was the case in the United States and EU, the development of BCA as an analytic exercise by academics and project-funding agencies has preceded the creation of governmental RIA systems and the establishment of ROBs to supervise regulation. Some developing countries are now moving to adopt formal systems of RIA and to establish ROBs.
Countries seeking to join the EU are adopting RIA: Serbia adopted Rules of Procedure requiring RIA for new legislation in , aft er having established a Council for Regulatory Reform and Quality Control in  (OECD b, ); and Croatia required RIA beginning in  and in  created an RIA Coordination Offi ce (OECD b, -). But Bulgaria has hesitated to adopt RIA, despite internal support (Truen ) . Turkey has adopted signifi cant administrative reforms, partly in response to encouragement from the EU and partly for domestic reasons, but apparently has not yet instituted RIA (Sezen ) .
Elsewhere, in Russia in  and South Africa in , the OECD held informational workshops on RIA. South Africa has moved ahead to develop a pilot RIA process supported by the Cabinet Offi ce (Truen ) . RIA was adopted for environmental regulations in Uganda in  (UNEP ), and in Kenya in  (World Bank Group ). In Brazil, the Secretariat of Economic Monitoring (SEAE) has recently adopted RIA for some sectors (OECD ), although some observers predict that a broader RIA process in Brazil may turn out to be signifi cantly infl uenced by political forces (Peci and Sobral ) . Th e use of BCA has also become widespread across numerous countries in Asia (Quah and Toh , off ering numerous case studies). BCA for both project evaluation and regulatory policy evaluation has been employed in China and India (Livermore ), although the development of an RIA process for China's regulatory agencies has lagged (Hu ) . Th e Philippines has an RIA process supervised by its National Economic and Development Authority, and is considering establishing an Offi ce of Best Regulatory Practice to provide expert oversight and advice on this RIA process (Bird, Plunkett, and Bosworth ) . Vietnam adopted RIA in -, with support from its Administrative Procedure Control Agency, the German GTZ, and the USAID's Vietnam Competitiveness Initiative (PERQ ; Truen ); an RIA is now required in Vietnam before a bill may be presented to the National Assembly (Truen ).
More generally, several key concepts in environmental law and risk regulation have experienced considerable diff usion and borrowing around the world, including BCA through RIA, environmental impact assessment (EIA), emissions trading (cap and trade), public participation and access to government information, and information disclosure requirements on industry ( Diff usion is a multifaceted concept of the spread of ideas (Levi-Faur ). Ideas can spread across numerous nodes in complex networks, including among individuals, groups, civil society, business coalitions, political parties, regions, agencies, countries, and international organizations (Lazer ) . And ideas may evolve as they spread and be employed diff erently in diff erent institutional settings. Th e literature on the diff usion of policy ideas is large (see generally Rose ; Dolowitz and Marsh ; James and Lodge ; Elkins and Simmons ; Berry and Berry ). Closely related concepts of diff usion as an evolutionary process have been developed in sociology (Hagerstrand ) , economics (Rogers ), law (Sand ; Watson ; Tushnet ), political science (Walker ; Lazer ; Weyland ; Simmons et al. ), biology (Arnold ; Grant ; Deakin ), and history of science (Galison ) . Legal scholars have borrowed from biologists the notion of "memes" as the unit, and counterpart of genes, in the evolution of ideas (Dawkins ; Deakin ) . In biology, evolution was fi rst understood to occur through competition among individuals within a species; later, through fi eld studies, biologists began to appreciate that evolution also occurs through the exchange of genetic material across species via interbreeding (called "hybridization") (Arnold ; Grant ). Likewise, in law, evolution was initially understood to occur through competition among individual rules within a legal system (Priest ; Elliott ; Farber ; but for doubts about the effi ciency of such legal evolution, see Hadfi eld ; Roe ); later, through the equivalent of fi eld studies, legal scholars came to appreciate that legal evolution also occurs through the exchange of legal concepts across legal systems via borrowing (Watson ; Elliott ; Wiener ; Deakin ; Wiener ), also called "hybridization" (Wiener , -; Wiener ; Wiener et al. , -; Delmas-Marty , -).
Th ere are reasons to expect the diff usion of regulatory policy approaches to have increased in recent years. Th e reality of contemporary international relations and information technology is a world of interconnectedness: networks and the transnational diff usion of ideas. Slaughter (, ) argues:
We live in a networked world . . . .In this world, the measure of power is connectedness . . . .Th e twentieth-century world was, at least in terms of geopolitics, a billiard-ball world, described by the political scientist Arnold Wolfers as a system of self-contained states colliding with one another . . . .Th e emerging networked world of the twenty-fi rst century, however, exists above the state, below the state, and through the state.
Interconnectedness enables the more fl uid spread of ideas, and thereby off ers increased opportunities to borrow and collaborate on policy solutions (Lazer ) . Regulatory ideas are increasingly being borrowed across the Atlantic, and worldwide, in an evolving web of global administrative law (Kingsbury et al. ; Rose-Ackerman and Lindseth ). Levi-Faur (, ) writes:
[T]he new order [of regulatory capitalism] is diff used rather than reproduced independently as a discrete event in each country and sector. Diff usion is a refl ection of an increasingly interdependent world. Beyond economic interdependencies, there is a growth of "horizontal" channels of diff usion and an increase in the export and import of institutions and knowledge.
But the fact that we observe similar legal rules, policies, or institutions arising in multiple places does not necessarily mean that the identical idea has been (or should be) adopted in every place. Th ere may be variation in the content of the idea as it is adopted in diff erent places. RIA adopted in one country may have a different institutional role and analytic content than RIA adopted in other countries (Radaelli ; Wiener and Alemanno ) . Careful comparison of the elements of each RIA system and ROB will be helpful in distinguishing what precisely was borrowed from where. And even if the idea is essentially the same in each place we observe it arising, that does not necessarily mean that the idea was learned and eagerly borrowed by one place from another; it might, for example, have been imposed coercively by a colonial power (Elkins and Simmons ; Simmons et al. ), or imitated unthinkingly as a passing fad (Lazer ), or arisen independently in each place in response to similar but independent conditions (as in "convergent evolution" and related concepts in biology, see Losos ). Dobbin, Simmons, and Garrett (, -) warn:
One weakness of many of the studies in this arena is that they take simple diff usion to be evidence of learning, without looking at whether there was evidence of the effi cacy of a policy innovation before second-and third-movers adopted it . . . .[R]ational learning theory implies a kind of cost-benefi t analysis . . . .People may draw lessons by observing the eff ects of policies other countries adopt, and they may engage in Bayesian updating, in which they constantly add new bits of evidence to the existing knowledge base . . . the overarching theme here is that countries learn to pursue eff ective policies.
A similar point is that successful legal borrowing involves a kind of cost-benefi t calculus: an evaluation of policies and institutions in other jurisdictions and a decision to borrow or translate the version that appears most promising for one's own needs (Wiener ; Levi-Faur ; Stone ). Th is kind of calculus-essentially what Benjamin Franklin advised-may be applied in horizontal legal borrowing across countries and in vertical legal borrowing across local, national, and international levels of governance (Wiener ; Levi-Faur ; Ovodenko and Keohane ) .
Th e borrowing calculus that drives the diff usion of RIA and ROBs is undoubtedly based on a combination of factors. One source appears to be a demand, at least among presidents, to manage the growing regulatory state. Consider the adoption of the U.S. Administrative Procedure Act in  following the New Deal, and the executive orders on regulatory review in the s and s following the burst of regulatory legislation of the preceding decade. Similarly, in Europe, Better Regulation and the IAB arose aft er the growth of EU regulation in the s. A similar pattern may be at work in other countries. Th e presidential impetus to manage the regulatory state through BCA, RIA, and ROBs can focus on reducing costs and cutting red tape, but it can also seek to increase social net benefi ts through promotion of desirable new regulations (Kagan ; Graham ; Revesz and Livermore ). In addition, economic crises and fears about economic competitiveness appear to spur regulatory reform eff orts-for example, in the United States aft er the stagfl ation of the late s, in Europe with the Lisbon Agenda of jobs and growth since , and in Korea and Mexico aft er economic crises in the s (Cordova-Novion and Jacobzone , Truen ). Looking ahead, RIA and ROBs will be more likely to be adopted if their methods can be made less costly and more benefi cial, especially in lower-income countries facing constraints on administrative capacity.
Evidence is accumulating that policy approaches to RIA and regulatory oversight have actually been borrowed, based on learning about effi cacy, across countries. Research on the emergence of "global administrative law" refl ects both hybridization and the role of purposive actors consciously borrowing ideas (Kingsbury et al. ) . Th ere is clearly an epistemic community of experts sharing experiences about RIA and ROBs across countries; examples include Radaelli (), Renda (), Jacobs (), Cordova-Novion and Jacobzone (), Quah and Toh (), Truen (), Wiener (), Wiener and Alemanno (), and this volume itself. Th e OECD has been a major supplier of information and encouragement on regulatory quality improvement not only in OECD member states but around the world, as have the overseas development agencies of key countries like the United States and Germany. Direct testimonial evidence is also available; consider this express account of borrowing in the EU Better Regulation initiative by the prime minister of Ireland:
Better Regulation is a core theme of our EU Presidency and featured prominently at the recent Spring Economic Council . . . .Th ere is a long tradition in 
From National Styles to Regulatory Evolution
Th is pattern of diff usion has important implications for the comparison and evolution of law. Comparative law has traditionally presumed that important diff erences across countries are explained by discrete "national styles of regulation" (Vogel ), "families" of legal systems (Zweigert and Kotz ), and early "legal origins" (La Porta et al. ) . Th e economic analysis of "legal origins" (La Porta et al. ) draws broad generalizations about modern business rules by grouping countries into ancient legal families (English, French, German, etc.) (for critiques of the "legal origins" literature, see Roe ; Curran ; Michaels ). Comparative law scholars have long recognized the possibilities for legal borrowing (Watson ) , though oft en these transplants are individual doctrines, which may take root in the other system, or wither, or act as irritants-rare graft s from one discrete legal system into another, whose reception in the second legal system is precarious. But as Reimann () pointed out, extensive diff usion of legal ideas can erode the traditional categories of comparative law that are based on discrete national legal systems. Th e reality of major reforms of regulatory systems around the world, through BCA, RIA and ROBs, suggests that the model of stable discrete national styles of regulation, or early legal origins determining modern regulation, needs substantial rethinking. De Francesco () fi nds little or no evidence that national legal origin explains modern adoption of RIA. Vogel () concedes that national regulatory systems are far more open to wholesale change than he had previously argued (Vogel ) . Even the "legal origins" advocates allow (in passing) that "legal origins" may not account for regulations in what they label "new spheres of social control, " nor for regulations adopted following crisis events (La Porta et al. , , )-two of the leading characteristics of risk regulation and regulatory reform.
Diff usion and hybridization are powerful forces in regulatory evolution. Hybridization, in law as in biology, exchanges genes or memes, and thereby interpenetrates the boundaries of "species, " "systems, " "families, " and "styles. " Hybridization creates hybrid off spring that are neither convergent with nor divergent from the prior populations, but new; they do not always succeed and are oft en less fi t, but they prosper when conditions change, opening niches for which the hybrids are well adapted. Undertaking both a dozen qualitative in-depth case studies and a quantitative analysis of a large-N sample of risks, Wiener et al. () fi nd that U.S. and European systems of risk regulation are undergoing substantial hybridization, exchanging ideas on many topics, including precaution, better regulation, impact assessment, regulatory oversight, economic incentive instruments, information disclosure, and other key elements. Risk regulation lives in an unfolding network society (Castells ; Slaughter ; De Francesco ) . Th e result is that it becomes increasingly diffi cult to distinguish or generalize about separate regulatory systems with discrete characters. Countries and cultures caricatured as sharply diff erent turn out to share a great deal (Baldwin ). Amid such hybridization, claims of discrete national legal systems or families become stereotypes of a bygone era (if it ever existed).
Th is does not mean that no comparisons can be made. (Such a claim would itself be a hasty generalization drawn from inadequate data.) Th e view that comparative law is impossible because legal systems are so intrinsically diff erent from each other that rules cannot be compared-what Siems (, , ) critiques as the "strong form" of the claim of the "end of comparative law"-is both self-negating (it depends on the very kind of sharp comparison that it purports to deny) and empirically unsupported (because the United States, Europe, and, increasingly, other countries are sharing legal ideas, not veering off on separate paths). As Hiram Chodosh has nicely shown, those who assert that "comparing apples and oranges" is impossible are committing three errors: fi rst, people do in fact compare apples and oranges at the grocery store every day (in terms of taste, color, shape, price, and so on); second, using the phrase "apples and oranges" itself requires a comparison between the two fruits (to deem them so diff erent); and third, such an assertion itself rests on a comparison between the degree of contrast between the two fruits and the degree of contrast between the other two items sought to be compared (Chodosh ) . (Th is defense of comparison applies not only to comparative law but to critiques of BCA as well.) Comparisons can and must be made, but on the basis of much more systematic empirical study, rather than generalizing to "national styles" based on a small and biased sample. Th e real tableau is a complex and evolving landscape that defi es easy generalization-the busy world depicted with evident aff ection by both Pieter Brueghel (a medieval European) and Richard Scarry (a more modern American). An improved understanding will involve comparison of rules and institutions as modules or memes that can be exchanged across interconnected legal systems, rather than of categorical generalizations about national legal systems or legal origins.
Regulatory Foresight
Many of the contemporary debates over BCA and RIA were foreseen, of course, by Benjamin Franklin. He wrote to his friend, the English scientist Joseph Priestley, about whether Priestley should accept a new job (Franklin ):
In the Aff air of so much Importance to you, wherein you ask my Advice, I cannot for want of suffi cient Premises, advise you what to determine, but if you please I will tell you how. When those diffi cult Cases occur, they are difficult, chiefl y because while we have them under Consideration, all the Reasons pro and con are not present to the Mind at the same time; but sometimes one Set present themselves, and at other times another, the fi rst being out of Sight. Hence the various Purposes or Inclinations that alternately prevail, and the Uncertainty that perplexes us.
To get over this, my Way is, to divide half a Sheet of Paper by a Line into two Columns; writing over the one Pro, and over the other Con. Th en during three or four Days Consideration, I put down under the diff erent heads short Hints of the diff erent Motives, that at diff erent Times occur to me, for or against the Measure. When I have thus got them all together in one View, I endeavour to estimate their respective Weights; and where I fi nd two, one on each side, that seem equal, I strike them both out. If I fi nd a Reason pro equal to some two Reasons con, I strike out the three. If I judge some two Reasons con, equal to some three Reasons pro, I strike out the fi ve; and thus proceeding I fi nd at length where the Ballance lies; and if aft er a Day or two of farther consideration, nothing new that is of Importance occurs on either side, I come to a Determination accordingly. And, tho' the Weight of Reasons cannot be taken with the Precision of Algebraic Quantities, yet, when each is thus considered, separately and comparatively, and the whole lies before me, I think I can judge better, and am less liable to make a rash Step; and in fact I have found great Advantage from this kind of Equation, in what may be called Moral or Prudential Algebra.
Franklin appears to have anticipated so many core aspects of BCA and RIA: the pitfalls of neglecting important impacts; the need for a structured approach to identifying and weighing the pros and cons; the inevitability of uncertainty; the need to "estimate their respective weights" but the inability to achieve mathematical precision (yet still an "Equation . . . Algebra"); the issue of commensurability (crossing out like items); the avowedly normative ("moral or prudential") exercise; the use of BCA as a tool to help us "judge better, " not an arithmetic rule; the cognitive approach to BCA as a tool to get all key aspects ("the whole") to appear "present to the Mind at the same time"; the behavioral role of BCA as a tool to avoid "a rash Step. " Th e letter itself illustrates the transatlantic diff usion of BCA via epistemic communities. It also records the diff usion of BCA preceding the establishment of RIA and ROBs. Franklin wrote to Priestley, and Priestley was in communication with Jeremy Bentham, who later wrote that he learned key elements of utilitarianism from Priestley (Bentham ); at least one historian suggests that Bentham got the idea of dividing and weighing the pros and cons from Franklin (Viner , ) , though it is diffi cult to fi nd evidence that Franklin and Bentham communicated directly (perhaps through Priestley). An intriguing additional possibility, diffi cult to document, is that Franklin, Priestley, and Bentham infl uenced the French engineer-economist Jules Dupuit, who developed the mathematics of marginal BCA in the early s (Ekelund and Hebert ) . Among other possible connections to Dupuit are that Franklin and Bentham each spent considerable time in Paris (Franklin was the American ambassador to France from  to ), and Bentham's work was published in French by Etienne Dumont in the early s. (Franklin's algebra was also later employed by Charles Darwin, to decide whether to marry, in ; a possible link is that Franklin had known Darwin's grandfathers, Erasmus Darwin and Josiah Wedgwood.) Franklin also helped send French engineers to America to assist with the Revolutionary War-a role that soon aft er contributed to the formation of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, modeled on the French Corps des Ponts et Chauss é es, the group that included Jules Dupuit. And much later, of course, BCA was apparently fi rst applied in the U.S. government by the Army Corps of Engineers under the Flood Control Act of  (Quah and Toh ; Hines ) .
Th e foresight needed in regulation is not only Ben Franklin's foresight about how to do BCA, but foresight about risks and regulatory impacts. In order to weigh the pros and cons, we need ways to foresee those pros and cons. Th at is the function of risk assessment, and of RIA. Foresight is also the ambition of precaution. Although precaution and RIA are oft en portrayed as antagonists, they are better understood as complementary components of a deeper phenomenon: the diff usion of regulatory foresight. Both precaution and RIA are eff orts to forecast the future consequences of current choices.
Humans have a capacity to envision future scenarios, but these scenarios tend to be constructed in the brain out of fragments of our memories, and so are partly rooted in what is mentally available (Gilbert and Wilson ; Schachter, Addis, and Buckner ). Th is property of bounded foresight helps explain the observation that public risk perceptions are oft en galvanized by "available" recent crisis events (Sunstein and Kuran ) . Precaution is an eff ort to foresee and prevent such risks before they occur. On the other side of the same coin, RIA is an eff ort to foresee the impacts of risk regulatory policies and ensure they are desirable. Meanwhile, policy diff usion itself can be vulnerable to the availability heuristic if policymakers adopt what they happen to see rather than what careful study would recommend (Elkins and Simmons ) .
Regulatory foresight is increasingly demanded as societies prosper and, ironically, as they become safer. Increased demand for regulation is spurred by factors including prosperity, impersonal commerce, advancing science, crisis events, and rising safety itself. Prosperity reduces immediate risks to survival and extends longevity. But prosperity also feeds a rising demand for amenities such as environmental quality and risk protection, enhances the scientifi c methods used to detect more subtle and latent risks, and brings new technologies that reduce some risks but may create new risks. Th ese factors help explain the increasing demand for precautionary policies in prosperous, safer countries-a phenomenon criticized by Wildavsky (), but perhaps understandable if demand for risk protection increases with income. Lower risk and greater longevity might also shift the demand for risk protection toward greater emphasis on latent risks, because even though greater longevity refl ects decreasing risks, longer life spans may also lead people to care more about risks that may arise farther into the future. And, in a decreasing-risk world, those risks that do occur may be seen as more unusual and more outrageous by the public, spurring greater demand for protective measures (Godard et al. , ) .
But precautionary regulations to reduce those risks can impose their own costs and ancillary impacts (risk-risk trade-off s) (Wiener ) . Hence the rising demand for RIA-a companion form of foresight. International diff usion of RIA and ROBs are manifestations of the demand for regulatory foresight.
As a society becomes even safer through the joint eff ects of prosperity, precaution, and better regulation, that society may come to confront even lowerprobability, higher-consequence risks-extreme catastrophic risks that would otherwise escape attention but that could be highly worth preventing (Posner ; Sunstein ) . Scientifi c detection capabilities improve with prosperity and continuing research. Longer life spans mean that extreme risks become more plausible within one's own lifetime and the lifetime of one's children and grandchildren. And the bequest value to the living of protecting future generations may increase with wealth, safety, and foresight. (Whereas the Environmental Kuznets Curve hypothesis suggests that pollution levels would rise and then fall as a society becomes ever wealthier, this risk-prosperity-foresight hypothesis suggests that risks would shift toward the tail of remote risks as a society prospers and reduces familiar risks.) But these extreme risks may nonetheless go neglected where they are so rare that no present or memorable incident triggers the "availability" heuristic (Weber ) . Furthermore, catastrophic risks may be neglected where the losses would be so large that the public becomes numb to their magnitude (Slovic ) , and where the catastrophe would wipe out the very institutions meant to provide remedies and ex post sanctions (thus weakening ex ante incentives for prevention). Th ese are "tragedies of the uncommons" (Wiener ; Wiener ), and they pose the strongest case for precaution. Still, precaution against tragedies of the uncommons must confront the twin challenges of priority-setting (choosing which extreme scenario to address, even as such scenarios multiply when the probability worth worrying about becomes ever smaller) and risk-risk trade-off s (because measures to prevent one catastrophic risk might induce another). Th us, even in cases where precaution is strongly warranted against uncertain catastrophic risks, the full foresight of RIA remains crucial.
To succeed, societies must manage both emerging risks (through precaution) and the ancillary impacts of their own risk protection measures (through impact assessment).
Both are forms of foresight. Th e international diff usion of these strategies enables more countries to take advantage of their benefi ts, and enables researchers to study variations across countries from which we can learn and improve such policies. Both hybridization and regulatory foresight are essential strategies for risk management in a changing world. But diff usion can go awry if policymakers are not good students or are not well informed about other policy measures and impacts (Elkins and Simmons ) . To make the most of these strategies, we should consciously construct a global policy laboratory (Greenstone ; Wiener )-which in turn involves a bit of regulatory hindsight. We will need ex post evaluation of regulatory policies and of the diff usion of regulatory oversight systems, in order to see what diff erence those policies and oversight systems actually make (Coglianese and Bennear ) . Th ese retrospective assessments will help us revise those policies and oversight systems, foster smarter diff usion, and improve our methods of ex ante prospective regulatory foresight and policy choice.
